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not consider the water rights appurtenant to the land under lease.
McCasland v. Miskell states New Mexico's general rule that water rights
not appurtenant to the land constitute separate pieces of property,
which the owner may convey separately from the land.
The court emphasized its ruling in Walker v. United States, where the
court overruled prior case law that stated that the right to use water "is
indispensible to the enjoyment of the land." Furthermore, the court
refused to distinguish between ground water rights and surface water
rights, stating that the same body of substantive law governs both
sources. Next, the court stressed that in order for a landowner to obtain the right to use from either source, the landowner must appropriate and apply the water to beneficial use before the landowner can
obtain a water right. Lastly, the court reinforced its ruling by citing
New Mexico water policy, which describes water as a scarce resource in
New Mexico that must adapt to changing societal needs. The court
further discredited Hydro's argument by explaining that water will always be "necessary" to the enjoyment of the land because it remains a
scarce resource in the West. The court believed that its ruling would
not force drastically negative consequences onto Hydro, who can simply purchase or lease "necessary" water rights on the free market.
Regarding Hydro's argument that it is entitled to the water rights
through the doctrine of agency, the court recognized that the relationship of lessee and lessor does not implicate agency. In Hansler v. Bass,
the New Mexico Court of Appeals stated that agency exists when one
party (the principal) authorizes another party (the agent) to act on his
behalf, so long as the principal retains control over the acts and decisions of the agent. However, in this case, CFP did not act as Inspiration's agent because Inspiration never controlled CFP's mining operations.
In addition, a lease creates merely a contractual relationship, not a
fiduciary relationship that indicates agency. While agency can arise if
the principal bears the responsibility for the acts of the agent, the lease
in this case expressly stated that CFP bore all risk under the lease. Finally, no language existed in the lease that either expressly, or indirectly, indicated that the parties intended to create an agency relationship.
Absent any language to the contrary, New Mexico law presumes that
no agency relationship exists between lessor and lessee.
Because the parties stipulated that no factual dispute existed and
petitioned the court to determine the dispute as a matter of law, the
court ruled that it could not remand the case back to the trial court for
any reason but to enter judgment in favor of Gray.
Daniel Woody
NORTH DAKOTA
Buchholz v. Barnes County Water Bd., 755 N.W.2d 472 (N.D. 2008)
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to keep a water course free of naturally occurring vegetation, but such
a duty applies only when the landowner affirmatively and deliberately
obstructs the flow of water on his land).
The Supreme Court of North Dakota considered whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Barnes
County Water Board ("Board") after it found no evidence to substantiate a claim that the Board had a duty to require downstream landowners to maintain the flow of water in the watercourse. North Dakota Century Code § 61-01-07 provides that any person who "illegally obstructs" any "ditch, drain, or watercourse" is liable for damages to the
party suffering an injury from the obstruction. Buchholz, the upstream
landowner, contended that he lost farming profits because the downstream landowner failed to encourage the flow of water off of his land
by burning and mowing the vegetation growing in his waterway.

Buchholz alleged that not only did the downstream landowner have a
duty to clear such natural vegetation under § 61-01-07, but also that the
Board was negligent because it did not find that such a duty existed.
On appeal, the court considered whether Buchholz had drawn the
district court's attention to anything in the record that created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Board and downstream
landowners had violated the statute.
First, the court stated that for the statute to place a duty upon
downstream landowners, the Board must make a finding that the statute applied. While all of the parties agreed that the statute applied
generally, the court found, based on a close reading, that an affirmative duty to keep a waterway clear only applied to "assessment drains."
No evidence in the record indicated there was an assessment drain
located on the downstream landowners' land or that Buchholz had
ever petitioned for the designation of one. The court held that although the Board is responsible for implementing a series of procedures to ensure that assessment drains remain unobstructed and working properly, the Board need not implement such procedures where it
has not designated an assessment drain. Consequently, to preclude
summary judgment, Buchholz should have highlighted material facts
in the record pointing to the Board's dereliction of duty when it failed
to designate an assessment drain on the downstream landowners'
lands.
Furthermore, the court held that the terms of the statute only apply if a landowner "affirmatively and deliberately acts to obstruct or
divert" the flow of water off of his land. It does not impose a duty on
the landowner to keep a watercourse free of naturally occurring vegetation. Thus, the court held that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the Board.
Allison Graboski

